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D he U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has proposed outlays of over $242 billion for fiscal 1997. Given historic patterns, this figure 
will represent a significant portion of over-
all government spending. For instance, 
based upon actual FY 95 economic results, 
the $255 billion DoD outlay represented 
3.7% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
17. l % of federal outlays, and 11 % of net 
public spending. (Source: Department of 
Defense Annual Report to the President 
and the Congress, March 1996.) In light 
of the magnitude of federal expenditures 
on defense related projects, it is important 
to consider the appropriate methods for 
evaluating proposed future projects that 
commit the U.S. government to expendi-
tures over a number of years. In particular, 
understanding how to discount future cash 
flows is critical in project selection. 
The Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) recently revised Circular ~umber 
A-94, "Guidelines and Discount Rates for 
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Pro-
grams." The circular provides guidance 
on benefit-cost, cost-effectiveness, and 
lease-purchase analyses. The guidance ap-
plies to all agencies which submit 
proposals to OMB in support of legislative 
and budget programs. The major change 
prescribed by the A-94 was a modification 
of the social discount rate. Rather than ap-
ply a fixed rate of 10%, the revised policy 
bases the appropriate discount rate to the 
opportunity cost of either displaced public 
funds or government borrowing. 
This article clarifies procedures for 
choosing the appropriate discounting and 
analysis techniques for multi-period DoD 
projects. Based on our experiences at the 
Defense Resources Management Institute, 
the reasons for discounting DoD propos-
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als are not clearly understood - let alone 
the correct procedures! (When we ask 
our students what a discount rate is, most 
of them reply "10%." Rarely do students 
provide an opportunity cost of capital per-
spective.) A review of the economics 
literature, government policies, and the 
literature pertaining to discounting in de-
fense publications demonstrates no 
general agreement about the "correct" 
discount rate to be used in project evalua-
tions. Significant differences in the 
policies of the General Accounting Office 
(GAO), the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO), and OMB add to the confusion 
about discounting within the government. 
Since most DoD analyses fall under the 
purview of the OMB, our explanations are 
based upon the OMB implementation 
policies. This very brief review of dis-
counting begins with an explanation of 
discounting from the theoretical and em-
pirical economics literature, which guides 
government policies on social discount-
ing. After discussing OMB discounting 
policies, we examine specific recommen-
dations and calculations from the OMB 
Circular A-94 pertaining to DoD propos-
als. We conclude with a discussion of how 
to deal with projects of unequal lives, in-
flation forecasting, and sensitivity analysis. 
The Purpose of Discounting 
Should we discount government projects? 
Isn't discounting contrary to the notion of 
exhausting annual budgetary levels to en-
sure future year funding? Although 
contradictory, the answer to BOTH ques-
tions is "Yes." Given reduced defense 
budgets, it is imperative that current and 
future spending decisions consider alter-
native uses for government funding. At the 
highest levels of government, money is 
taken out of the private sector today to en-
sure future gro~th opportunities (such as 
the funding of the national interstate high-
way infrastructure). Although less obvious 
at lower levels of budgetary decision-mak-
ing, the concept of lost opportunity must 
drive every major budget decision, espe-
cially those which obligate future 
government expenditures (multi-period 
activities). Some economists question the 
need to discount the cash flows of project 
alternatives once the project is approved 
by Congress. Clark believes discounting 
obscures the budgetary implications of ex-
amining discounted cash flows. While in 
theory, this is an unresolved issue, current 
guidance is clear: Government agencies 
must discount projects of multi-period 
cash flows. Therefore, the relevant ques-
tion becomes, "What is the correct 
discount rate for government projects?" 
The correct discount rate requires under-
standing the purpose of discounting. 
Discounting is necessary for two reasons. 
First, discounting allows comparison of 
dissimilar multi-period cash flows. Sec-
ond, it allows comparison of a particular 
program to the "expected next-best" use 
of funds; this is the "opportunity cost" 
concept of resource allocation. Although 
some disagree, we strongly believe that 
discounting is NOT designed (or suited) 
to mitigate the uncertainty of predicting 
future cash flows. We recommend cash 
flow sensitivity analysis (based upon dis-
tributions of expected cash flows) rather 
than folding uncertainty into the opportu-
nity cost of fund allocation. 
Discount Rates and Opportunity Costs 
Within economics literature, the cost of a 
government project is lost investment and 
lost consumption potential for the general 
public (Rosen, 1992). The rate represent-
ing lost investment is the before-tax rate of 
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return on investment. For example, if the 
annual rate of return on the last $1000 of 
private investment yields 9%, the appro-
priate social discount rate should be 9%. 
The opportunity cost of the project is the 
$90 that would have been generated in the 
private sector (9% return on a $1,000 in-
vestment). Taxes are not relevant; the $90 
would either benefit individuals, or indi-
viduals and the government; in both cases 
it is available to society. 
Funds for public sector projects generally 
come at the expense of both investment 
and consumption. Traditional theories 
about the social discount rate suggest us-
ing a combination of the consumer's and 
investor's rates. Empirical evidence of 
completed analyses indicates that the so-
cial discount rates are quite varied, in the 
range of 2-12%P However, government 
restrictions add to the complexity since 
"the social discount rate is not necessari-
ly equal to the private rate of return. This 
is because the government cannot (be-
cause of restricted debt/monetary policy) 
transfer resources at will between periods 
- it cannot in effect trade freely on all 
markets" (Kolb & Scheraga). 
Three arguments suggest that the social 
discount rate is lower than the opportuni-
ty cost revealed by market rates of return. 
The first argument contends that the pri-
vate sector devotes too few resources for 
saving - implicitly applying a too-high 
discount rate to future benefits and returns 
(Gramlich 1981, p.97). Rosen suggests 
this omniscience and benevolence is unre-
alistic - even selfish individuals often find 
it in their personal interest to engage in 
long-term projects that will benefit future 
generations. The second argument is pa-
ternalistic: people cannot adequately weigh 
future benefits. Assuming individuals are 
not farsighted enough to envision future, 
they discount the value of future benefits at 
too high a rate (Pigou, 1932, Chapter 2). 
The third argument is that the market un-
der-estimates the positive, synergistic 
effects of investments. Therefore the mar-
ket actually under-values the real benefits 
of investment activity (Arrow 1962). A low-
er discount rate is one (indirect) method 
of remedying this error in estimating fu-
ture benefit. 
Conversely, Quirk & Terasawa (1991) sug-
gest the social discount rate is higher than 
the opportunity cost revealed by market 
rates of return. This argument is based up-
on the "opportunity cost rate of return" 
concept, which utilizes a discount rate 
equal to the "maximal rate of return avail-
able from the portfolio of unfunded 
government projects" (Quirk & Terasawa, 
pp. 16-17). The authors contend that peo-
ple make choices given their personalities 
and abilities to save, often ignoring poten-
tial savings. For example, it is not 
uncommon for parents to save for their 
children's college education at a low rate of 
interest, while simultaneously borrowing 
on their credit cards at annual rates of 18% 
or more. Lacking a dominant theory, it is 
logical to employ a combination of con-
sumption and investment rates to represent 
the social discount rate. In many cases, this 
Figure 1: Summary of Discount Policy by Type of Government Project 




Internal Government Investment 
(cost-benefit) 
Asset Sale 
Benefits and costs provided to 
the public. Example: Highway 
construction 
Benefits are equal or unknown. 
Example: Weapons systems 
Analysis of purchase versus 
lease of comparable system. 
Example: Lease vs Purchase 
military family housing 
Federal investments providing 
increased federal revenues or 
decreased federal costs. Example: 
An investment in a more energy 
efficient building system 
Analysis of value of government 
asset. Example: Sale of property. 
Dlsc••••·PellCJ 
and RecOlllmenclatleas 
Base case: 7%, use GDP deflator 
to adjust for inflation. Perform 
Sensitivity Analysis. Find IRR if 
appropriate. 
Base case: Real Treasury 
Borrowing Rate on marketable 
securities, matched to expected 
system life cycle. 
Note: Source is OMB Circular A-94, pp.9-11. Analyses must be performed in either nominal or real dollars (not both). The 
rates shown assume analysis based upon real dollars. Use 7% if project provides a mix of internal and external benefits. 
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rate exceed'> the 2-12% range employed by 
traditional economic analyses. 
Another concern related to applying mar-
ket rates as proxies of the cost of 
government spending involves the source 
of funds. Does it matter whether or not 
the project is financed with U.S. govern-
ment borrowing or a tax increase? A tax 
increase represents both lost consumption 
and lost investment possibilities for the 
private sector (which implies a combina-
tion of the rates). The cost of U.S. 
government borrowing is the rate paid on 
Treasury bills with maturity comparable to 
the program being evaluated (which 
would imply using the same Treasury Bill 
rate while discounting). Does government 
borrowing displace other investments, 
some of which may have higher potential 
market return rates? These questions 
highlight the difficulties associated with 
assuming a social discount rate equal to a 
market or Treasury rate. 
Lind ( 1990) proposes the social discount 
rate be viewed in light of changes in the 
world economy. He suggests that the world 
economy is a (fairly) open economy, in 
which governments borrow and lend on 
the world market at world interest rates. Al-
though his assumption that the C.S. can 
freely borrow and lend on the world mar-
ket, without affecting interest rates, is 
controversial, Lind docs prescribe policies 
relevant to several t)pes of projects. 
In sum, selecting the "appropriate" dis-
count rate is much more complex than 
merely selecting a single value for all 
project initiatives. Not surprisingly, gov-
ernment agencies have reacted to the 
variety of opinions by formulating different 
discounting policies (depending upon 
their respective sources). 
•Genera/Accounting Office (GAO) 
policies are consistent with basic eco-
nomic principles and fairly easy to 
implement (GAOIOCE-17.1.1 Dis-
count Rate Policy). The base case 
GAO discount rate is the interest rate 
for marketable Treasury debt with 
maturity comparable to the program 
being evaluated. 
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• Congressional Budget Office ( CBO) 
policy, on the other hand, applies a 
base-case discount rate of 2% 
(Hartman, 1990). 
• Office ofllianagement and Budget 
(01HB) has chosen 7% as the base-
case measure of the average pre-tax 
rate of return on an investment in the 
private sector. However, OMB pre-
scribes discount rates depending 
upon the recipients of the benefits. 
For instance, OMB prescribes the 
base-case 7% only for analyses with 
measurable benefits and costs ac-
cruing to directly to society. OMB 
prescribes using Treasury Rates of 
comparable time periods to the pro-
ject life cycle as discount rates for 
Internal projects, cost-effectiveness 
analyses, lease-purchase, and asset 
sales proposals. 
OMB Categorization of Government 
Projects by Costs and Benefits 
As mentioned, the OMB base-case dis-
count rate policy depends upon the type 
of projects being analyzed. The OMB cir-
cular A-94 provides guidance for project 
evaluation. When costs and benefits arc 
measurable, the circular requires a classi-
fication of costs and benefits as either 
Internal or External. This determination 
affects the discount rate applied during 
the analysis. 
OMB defines External benefits and costs as 
those that have direct, measurable impact 
on the public. For example, suppose a gov-
ernment agency is considering an entirely 
new service or initiative. If this initiative 
will displace (or provide) funds from (to) 
the public, it is an External program. In 
this instance, the public investment re-
quired to provide future benefits displaces 
private investment and consumption, so 
the appropriate discount rate must ac-
count for the opportunity cost of both 
consumption and investment. The A-94 
dictates a base-case rate of 7% for External 
cost-benefit analyses, accompanied with 
extensive discount rate sensitivity analyses. 
For other projects, the cash flows affect 
only Internal government budget alloca-
tions. For example, the decision to 
consolidate depot operations is an exam-
ple of an internal program. The depot 
charges government agencies for their ser-
'vices to cover their operating costs. This is 
an Internal cost-benefit initiative because 
benefits and costs primarily affect only the 
government. Of course, even in our exam-
ple, the private sector ultimately receives 
benefits (a private company will receive a 
contract to perform the consolidation). 
However, the initiative primarily lowers the 
costs of depot operations which, in turn, 
reduces their charges to government agen-
cies for maintenance activities. 
Other projects within this Internal catego-
ry include projects with undetermined or 
undefined benefits. For example, deter-
mining dollar benefits of the Advanced 
Tactical Fighter aircraft is impossible. ln 
such instances, Internal cost-effectiveness 
analyses are required, and the relevant op-
portunity cost is the marginal government 
cost of borrowing. All cost-effectiveness 
analyses, according to OMB, require a dis-
count rate equal to the U.S. Treasury's 
borrowing rates (Treasury bills with matu-
rity lengths equal to the project life cycle). 
Lease-purchase and government asset sale 
decisions are also considered to have 
costs only to the federal government. 
Again, OMB requires these types of pro-
jects to be discounted using Treasury 
borrowing rates. Figure 1 summarizes the 
five projects types and the mandated dis-
count policy for each. 
A-94 Recommendations for 
WithinDoD 
As mentioned, OMB Circular A-94 requires 
determination of the types of costs and 
benefits associated with proposed projects. 
If costs and benefits are External - as in 
the case of the Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey, 
which is considered a joint project with a 
commercial firm - OMB suggests using 
7% in performing the cost-benefit analysis. 
The majority of DoD activities do not lend 
themselves to a dollar evaluation of bene-
fits (e.g., weapons systems evaluations). In 
these cases, benefits are assumed equal, 
unknown, or immeasurable. OMB's posi-
tion is based upon the opportunity cost of 
competing government projects. Thus, 
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once again, the government's cost of bor-
rowing (Treasury Rate) is the appropriate 
discount rate. 
In summary, the type of analysis support-
ing DoD decisions depends upon the 
decision authority. Whenever Congres-
sional approval has been previously 
granted (and the DoD is merely selecting 
the best option of meeting requirements), 
selection of the most cost-effective alter-
native is an Internal governmental budget 
allocation decision. In this case, the gov-
ernment cost of borrowing (Treasury 
rate) is the appropriate discount rate. If 
Congress has not previously approved a 
program, it must be evaluated against 
non-DoD opportunities; thus the 7% dis-
count rate applies. (Recall our original 
question of whether to discount. The level 
of analysis does make a difference in the 
"rate," yet the concept remains: Discount 
multi-period projects.) 
We have mentioned that OMB policy stipu-
lates calculating a base-case analysis for 
constant dollar costs using comparable, 
real Treasury Borrowing Rates. Compara-
bility requires that the maturity date of the 
Treasury bill rate match the life cycle of the 
project. Each year the circular updates rel-
evant multi-period rates. Figure 2 shows 
current FY 97 rates from A-94, Appendix 
C. Rates are provided annually at the time 
of the President's budget submission to 
Congress (and are available on the World 
Wide Web at http://www.whitehouse.gov 
/WH/EOP/omb or by calling OMB at 202-
395-3381). Use linear interpolation to 
calculate the discount rate for programs 
with different life cvcle durations than 
shown. For example,· a 4-year project (in 
real dollars) would be evaluated using a 
discount rate of 2.2%. Use 30-year rates 
for projects exceeding 30 years. 
OMB will accept other justified discount 
rates. For example, construction projects 
often result in the government taking on a 
construction loan. In this case, the pre-
vailing market construction loan rate 
would be suitable for discounting alterna-
tives. In all cases, discount rate sensitivity 
analysis should be conducted. 
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The discount policy for lease-purchase 
proposals is straightforward. Use the Trea-
sury rates as given in A-94, Appendix C. 
Note, however, that lease-purchase analy-
sis does not apply to the decision to 
purchase an asset. Lease-purchase cost-
benefit analyses apply only after the 
decision is made to procure services of an 
asset (A-94, p. 15). 
Discount Factors Should Match Specific 
Cash Flows 
Detailed analyses require calculation of 
net present values (NPVs) of benefits mi-
nus costs for cost-benefit analyses, or the 
present discounted costs, for cost-effec-
tiveness studies. Although the timing of 
cash flows varies by project, discount 
rates are published only as annual values. 
Therefore, the timing of cash flows affects 
the calculation of the discount factors. We 
examine end-of-the-year, mid-year, quar-
terly, and continuous discount factor 
calculations. If r is the annual discount 
rate, and n is the year being discounted 
(or q is the quarter being discounted), 
then basic discounting factors according 
to OMB specification are: 
End-of-year: 
Mid-year: (l + r)<n-05) 
End-of-quarter: 
(1 + r)q14 
Mid-quarter: 
(l + r)(q-05)/4 
For example, compare the discounted val-
ue of a $100 cash flow, at an annual 
discount rate of 6%, when cash flows oc-
cur first at the end-of-the-second-year, 
then at mid-year of the second year: 
End-of-year, second year: 
1 $100* =$89.00 (I+ 0.06) 2 
Mid-year, second year: 
1 $100 * = $91.63 (1 + 0.06) (Z-O 5) 
Notice that we have used the method sug-
gested by OMB (also found in Air Force 
Regulation 1 73-1 5) as opposed to the 
conventional method used in business and 
finance. The conventional method uses 
the general formula, where r is the annu-
al interest rate, m is the number of 
discounting periods per year, and n is the 
number of discounting periods. According 
to the conventional method, the present 
value of $100 due at mid-year of the sec-
ond year is: 
Mid-year, second year: 
$100 * 1 = $91.50 
(1 + 0.061 2) 3 . 
Notice the difference between the calcula-
tions; the OMB method gives a discounted 
present value of $91.63, and the conven-
tional method gives $91.50. Mercier notes 
that the OMB (&Air Force) method ig-
nores the impact of the frequency of 
payments, while the conventional method 
clearly recognizes this impact and differen-
tiates between the nominal discount rates 
and effective discount.' Sensitivity analysis 
will partially mitigate this distinction. 
The A-94 provides a table of End-of-the-
Year, Mid-Year and Beginning-of-Year 
discount factors, assuming an annual dis-
count rate of 7%. If the actual timing of 
cash flows is uncertain, analysts are in-
structed to assume that cash flows occur 
in a steady stream throughout the period 
and apply the mid-period discount factor. 
We note mid-period factors do not give 
exact expectations of costs and benefits; 
rather, the mid-period assumption is a 
reasonable way to account for ("aver-
age") cash flo~s when the exact timing of 
those flows is unknown. Analysts must re-
alize the tradeoff between the timing and 
estimation of cash flows, and select the 
most appropriate discounting period. As 
the timing ( # of periods per year) in-
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Figure Z: Real and Nominal Discount Rates for Projects of Varying Length 
Cull ·Flows: 3-Year S-Year 7·Year 10-Year 30..Year 
Real 2.1% 2.3% 2.5% 2.7% 2.8% 
Nominal 5.0% 5.3% 5.5% 5.7% 5.8% 
Note: The U.S. Treasury's borrowing rates change daily. The rates suggested by the update to Appendix C in the A-94 
(valid only through February, 1997) for 3- to JO-year (nominal) projects ranged from 5.4 to 5. 7%. 
creases, estimation of exact cash flows be-
comes more costly and less accurate. 
(Annual time periods are nearly always 
sufficiently precise.) As a cautionary note, 
Appendix B of Circular A-94 states that 
mid-year factors are calculated "by multi-
plying year-end factors by 1.0344 (the 
square root of 1.07). This illustration is 
misleading. It applies ONLY for a 7% dis-
count rate. We strongly recommend using 
the correct formulas instead of tables. Do-
ing so ensures proper calculation of 
discount factors as well as facilitating sub-
sequent discount rate sensitivity analyses. 
Further Considerations 
We will now discuss a few other important 
issues: evaluation of unequal-life projects, 
inflation, and sensitivity analysis. Compar-
ison of the net costs of unequal-life 
projects requires consideration of the 
time discrepancy across alternatives. An 
alternative with a projected life-cycle of 
five years cannot be compared directly to 
an alternative which has a life-cycle of ten 
years because arguing equal effectiveness 
between the two alternatives is not sensi-
ble. To compensate for unequal life cycles, 
the best approach involves calculating a 
salvage value of the longer alternative in 
the last year of the shorter alternative, 
then comparing the two equal-duration al-
ternatives. Clearly, obtaining an accurate 
out-year salvage value estimation is a chal-
lenge. Rather than attempt to obtain "the" 
estimate, determine three estimates: the 
best, worst, and likely cases. Then, per-
form the subsequent present value 
calculations using all three salvage values. 
Throughout this article, we have assumed 
real dollar estimates of cash flows. This 
assumes either cash flow estimates were 
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in today's dollars, or then-year (nominal) 
estimates have been adjusted for inflation. 
Hopefully, the former is applicable, since 
accounting for inflation is difficult. The A-
94 assumes that inflation changes 
according to the rate of increase in the 
GDP. Analysts are safe using the GDP eco-
nomic deflator to create real dollar 
estimates from nominal values. If more 
accurate (?) estimates are necessary, fore-
casts from independent forecasting 
agencies such as Wharton Econometric 
Forecasting Associates are available. 
Rather than attempting to predict inflation, 
it will likely prove more expedient to rely 
upon the GDP growth estimates accompa-
nied with extensive sensitivity analysis of 
inflation rates. Do NOT combine inflation 
and discount rates into one discount fac-
tor. While mathematically the results may 
be identical, all intuition related to the op-
portunity costs of foregone choices will be 
lost. Perform separate sensitivity analyses. 
Account for inflationary effects first, then 
opportunity costs (discount rates). Rea-
sonable assumptions and methodical 
testing of alternatives will provide robust 
outcomes and create confidence in pro-
ject recommendations. 
Conclusion 
This article m1ews the literature on social 
discounting, the OMB Circular i'io. A-94 
related to government procedures for dis-
counting, and important aspects of 
discount policy for DoD projects. OMB's 
policy requires discount rates to be chosen 
based on the types of costs and benefit'> as-
sociated \\1th the proposal. The majority of 
DoD projects should use rates other than 
the 7% highlighted in the main text of the 
Circular. Project duration, timing of cash 
flows, and uncertainty are a few important 
considerations an analyst must address in 
correctly performing a cost-benefit, cost-
effectiveness, or lease-purchase analysis. 
Closer attention to the economy (using 
Treasury Bill rates as discount rates) pro-
duces cost-benefit (effectiveness) analyses 
which are more relevant for decision mak-
ers. Analysts working on defense projects 
must know when and how to apply correct 
discounting techniques in order to insure 
that their analyses accurately reflect the 
opportunity cost<; of decisions at hand. The 
list of references accompan~ing this article 
contains several excellent conceptual and 
applied sources regarding discount rates 
and present value analysis. 
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Endnotes 
1. This issue addresses social discounting 
exclusively Literature (by Lind, 
Scheraga, Quirk and Terasawa, and 
others) generally suggests that a real 
rate of return of about 2% accurately 
approximates the opportunity cost of 
funds displaced from the private sector 
by the government. 
2. However, Mercier makes several errors 
in his calculations (for example, his 
conventional factors in Table 2 are 
not correct) that are confusing to 
practitioners. 
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